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Solidarity has a key role to play in the allocation of responsibility for refugee 
protection, as Article 80 TFEU implies. Yet, EU law fails to provide a definition and 
a clear indication of what it entails, especially as for its external reach. Against this 
background, this contribution embarks on a theoretical/practical investigation of the 
normative bases of ‘EU solidarity’. Building on a cosmopolitan vision, it unpacks the 
multi-polar/multi-functional nature of the concept, as a founding value and 
constitutional (meta-)principle of EU law. In such guise, it will posit that solidarity 
gives rise to an (autonomous) primary law duty of responsibility sharing/good faith 
cooperation that requires ‘fairness’ and ‘respect for fundamental rights’, as a 
uniform/all-pervading structural command generally applicable across policy fields. 
So configured, solidarity governs intra/extra-EU relations (based on the principle of 
coherence). The institutional, material, and procedural aspects of solidarity are thus 
explored to distil its horizontal, vertical, and systemic facets. Combined, they 
arguably produce a triple duty of conduct, loyalty, and result that permeates EU 
integration as a whole, calling into question the self-serving approach currently 
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1. Introduction: More than Meets the Eye 
 
Talks about the importance of solidarity within the refugee law regime are not new. 
The international protection system is predicated on international cooperation and 
discussions about ‘burden sharing’ have been common in the recent past.1 The 
preamble to the 1951 Refugee Convention (CSR51) contains precisely a reference to 
the need for ‘international co-operation’ for a ‘satisfactory solution’ to be found to 
situations of forced displacement, ‘considering that the grant of asylum may place 
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries’.2  
Perspectives on the principle, however, vary, with stark differences between 
countries along the ‘North-South’ axis. While Western countries generally embrace 
the ‘Safe Third Country’ (STC) notion,3 maintaining that earlier presence in the 
territory of a State, through passage or stay, engages legal responsibility to determine 
status and provide protection,4 developing countries emphasize the negative impact of 
such a rule, highlighting its ‘burden shifting’ rather than ‘burden sharing’ effect.5 
Very tellingly, prior to the conclusion of the EU-Turkey deal in March 2016,6 Turkey 
persistently opposed STC transfers, underlining the unfair result to which they lead, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Lecturer in Law, Queen Mary University of London. 
1 See, e.g., M. Gottwald, ‘Burden Sharing and Refugee Protection’, in E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (OUP, 2014) 525; A. Hurwitz, 
1 See, e.g., M. Gottwald, ‘Burden Sharing and Refugee Protection’, in E. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. 
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies (OUP, 2014) 525; A. Hurwitz, 
The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (OUP, 2009); E. Thielemann, ‘Between 
Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European Union’, 16 JRS (2003), p. 253; J. 
Hathaway (ed.), Reconceiving International Refugee Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1997); A. Suhrke, 
‘Burden Sharing during Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective Action versus National 
Action’, 11 JRS (1998), p. 396. 
2 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 189 UNTS 150 (hereafter: CSR51), Recital 4. 
3 For analysis, see V. Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality of the "Safe Third Country" Notion Contested: 
Insights from the Law of Treaties’, in G. Goodwin-Gill and P. Weckel (eds.), Migration & Refugee 
Protection in the 21st Century: Legal Aspects (The Hague Academy of International Law Centre for 
Research/Martinus Nijhoff, 2015), p. 665. 
4 See, e.g., Statement by the UK on behalf of the European Community and Member States, 
A/AC.96/SR.472, para. 78. See also UNHCR, EXCOM Conclusion No. 58 (XL) of 1989, Report of the 
40th Session, A/AC.96/737. 
5 See, e.g., Statement by Brazil, A/AC.96/SR.485, para. 2; Statement by Bulgaria, A/AC.96/SR.485, 
para. 47; Statement by Poland, A/AC.96/SR.475, para. 37; Statement by Sudan, A/AC.96/SR.427, 
para. 69; Statement by China, A/AC.96/SR.427, para. 10. 
6  EU-Turkey Statement, 18 March 2016, at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2016/03/18-eu-turkey-statement/> (hereafter: EU-Turkey Statement). 
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regionalizing protection and concentrating responsibility on transit countries that 
happen (by geographical chance) to be closer to refugee-producing States.7  
Imbalances and disagreement on how to allocate international protection 
duties have not been overcome over the years. Discussions on the ‘irregular secondary 
movements’ strand of the Convention Plus initiative, launched in 2002 by UNHCR, 
have yielded no results,8 and calls for a ‘New Deal’ on burden sharing, nearly ten 
years later, have yet to materialize.9 The debate has regained momentum during the 
‘refugee crisis’ and, particularly, after the 2016 New York Summit, ‘acknowledg[ing] 
a shared responsibility to manage large movements of refugees and migrants in a 
humane, sensitive, compassionate and people-centred manner’. 10  Such ‘shared 
responsibility’ is considered essential to demonstrating ‘solidarity with, and support 
for, the millions of people […] who, for reasons beyond their control, are forced to 
uproot themselves[…]’.11  
In response, the UNHCR Executive Committee programme (EXCOM) has 
‘reaffirmed’ its ‘commitment to international solidarity and responsibility- and 
burden-sharing involving all members of the international community’ and has 
engaged itself ‘to further strengthening international cooperation and solidarity and 
equitable responsibility and burden sharing’.12 Yet, a codified ‘solidarity obligation’ 
at the universal level is still lacking,13 which diminishes the legal strength of the 
principle and its practical traction as an ordering standard to apportion responsibility 
for ‘durable solutions’ on the global scale.  
Nonetheless, this contribution argues that there is more than meets the eye, 
especially within the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), upon the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Report of the Sub-Committee of the Whole, A/AC.96/671, para. 68. See also statements by Turkey, 
A/AC.96/SR.418, para. 74; A/AC.96/SR.430, para. 66; A/AC.96/SR.456, para. 6-7. 
8For an overall presentation and related documents see: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a2792106.html>.  
9 ‘UNHCR chief calls for "New Deal" in managing the world's displaced’, UNHCR News Stories, 8 
Oct. 2010, at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4caf29e79.html>.  
10 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, A/71/L.1, 13 Sept. 2016, para. 11. 
11 Ibid., para. 8. 
12 EXCOM Conclusion on international cooperation from a protection and solutions perspective, No. 
112 (LXVII) 2016, Recital 4 and para. 1. See also Conclusions No. 18 (XXXI) 1980; No. 40 (XXXVI) 
1985; No. 52 (XXXIX) 1988; No. 56 (XL) 1989; No. 80 (XLVII) 1996; No. 67 (XLII) 1991; No. 100 
(LV) 2004; No. 101 (LV) 2004; No. 104 (LVI) 2005; No. 105 (LVII) 2006, para. (i) (i); No. 107 
(LVIII) 2007, para. (b) (xiii); No. 109 (LX) 2009; No. 111 (LXIV) 2013; and No. 91 (LII) 2001. 
13 G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000), at 277; M. Barutciski and A. Suhrke, 
‘Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and Burden-sharing’, 14 JRS 
(2001), p. 95, at p. 109; and G. Noll, ‘Protection in a Spirit of Solidarity’, in R. Byrne, G. Noll, and J. 
Vedsted-Hansen (eds.), New Asylum Countries? (Kluwer, 2002). 
 4 
positivization of imperative ‘solidarity clauses’ in several areas across EU law, 
including the immigration field.14 It submits that there is an (autonomous) EU 
requirement to engage externally with the wider world in a manner that is ‘solidarity-
prone’ and produces ‘fair’ outcomes for refugees;15 that EU solidarity produces ‘hard’ 
legal obligations on the regional plane, adding concretion to international statements 
on sharing and cooperation, as part of the principal obligation to ‘develop a common 
policy on asylum […] with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country 
national [TCN] requiring international protection […]’ enshrined in Article 78(1) 
TFEU.  
With this in mind, the article tracks the normative bases, structure, and 
function(s) of solidarity within primary law. It identifies three complementary 
dimensions: the inter-state or ‘horizontal’ dimension; the state-refugee or ‘vertical’ 
dimension; and the state-regime or ‘systemic’ dimension of solidarity, requiring 
commitment to the international protection system as such, the EU and the other 
Member States, and the refugees themselves. This definitional effort draws on the 
related principles of fairness and respect for fundamental rights, 16  good faith 
engagement with third countries (or ‘partnership’ principle),17 and the principle of 
loyal cooperation enshrined in the EU treaties.18 Article 80 TFEU is assessed against 
this background to distil the key features and effects of the (composite) principle it 
encloses (of ‘solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility’) on CEAS norms. An 
argument is then put forward, on the basis of the principle of coherence between 
internal and external policies of the EU,19 on the reach of solidarity in relations with 
third countries and refugees abroad.  
 
2. The Normative Foundations of EU Solidarity 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Note the ‘shall’ in Art 80 TFEU. See also Art 2(4) of the 1969 OAU Convention on Refugee 
Problems in Africa: ‘Where a Member State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, 
such Member State may appeal directly to other Member States […] and such other Member States 
shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international cooperation take appropriate measures to 
lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum’ (emphasis added). 
15 TFEU, Article 67(2). 
16 TFEU, Articles 67 and 2, as well as TEU, Article 6. 
17 TEU, Articles 3(5) and 21. 
18 TEU, Articles 4(3) and 13(3). 
19 TE, Article 21(3), 2nd indent. See also TEU, Articles 13(1), 16(6), 18(4), 26(2). 
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The idea of solidarity as an ordering principle of legal relations has a long pedigree. 
In the civil law system of post-revolutionary France, the notion was linked with the 
republican ideals of liberté, égalité, fraternité, which found articulation in the 
Napoleonic Code of 1804.20 Classical sociologists have built on this and theorised the 
normative foundations of the principle, concluding to the existence of a ‘societal 
community’ as an essential condition of possibility for solidarity to thrive.21 Under 
this conception, recognition and identity or affinity with others is what allows for a 
sense of belonging, mutuality, and common struggle to emerge that motivates the 
pooling of resources and joint action towards a shared objective.22 
Alternative elaborations have added ideological elements to the more 
empirical understandings of solidarity,23 underscoring the unifying traits of the group, 
such as class, race or other features, and the political importance of their collective 
cause,24 allowing for several allegiances to materialize and co-exist or compete 
against one another.25 Solidarity then transpires as a feeling of reciprocal empathy and 
responsibility among members of a more or less defined group, triggering communal 
assistance and support in pursuance of a ‘higher’ goal.26  
This is why solidarity may strike as antagonistic to cosmopolitanism.27 The 
presupposition of a more or less defined community, whose members ‘feel’ solidarity 
between them, seems in contradiction to ideas of global justice towards the generic, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See, extensively, S. Stjerno, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (CUP, 2005); V. Boon and 
G. Delanty, ‘Cosmopolitanism and Europe: Historical Considerations and Contemporary Applications’, 
in C. Rumford (ed.), Cosmopolitanism and Europe (Liverpool University Press, 2007), p. 31.  
21 Applying Durkeim and Weber’s theories to contemporary European integration, see H.-J. Trenz, 
Elements of a sociology of European Integration, ARENA Working Paper No. 11/May 2008, at: 
<http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/arena-working-papers/2001-
2010/2008/wp08_11.html>.  
22 L. Wilde, ‘The Concept of Solidarity: Emerging from the Theoretical Shadows?’, 9 British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations (2007), p. 171. See also, W. Rehg, ‘Solidarity and the Common 
Good: An Analytic Framework’, 38 Journal of Social Philosophy (2007), p. 7.  
23 On the distinction between empirical and normative interpretations of solidarity, see M. Pensky, 
‘Solidarity as Fact or Norm? Social Integration between System and Lifeworld’, 32 Philosophy and 
Social Criticism (2006), p. 819. 
24 P. Baldwin, The Politics of Social Solidarity (CUP, 1990), specially p. 29-31.  
25 N. Karagiannis, ‘Introduction’, in N. Karagiannis (ed.), European Solidarity (Liverpool University 
Press, 2007), P. 2; L. Magnusson and B. Strath (eds.), European Solidarities: Tensions and 
Contentions of a Concept (Peter Lang, 2007). 
26 D. Heyd, ‘Justice and Solidarity: The Contractarian case against Global Justice’, 38 Journal of Social 
Philosophy (2007), p. 112. 
27 See, generally, A. Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, (WW Norton, 2006), 
building on J. Derrida, ‘Politics of Friendship’, 50 American Imago (1993), p. 3; and U. Beck, The 
Cosmopolitan Vision (Polity, 2006). 
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all-inclusive, non-group of humanity as a whole.28 Under this optic, solidarity requires 
exclusion and positioning against a perceived ‘other’. So, in principle, while 
transnational forms of solidarity may be possible beyond national iterations of the 
same—provided there is an underpinning sense of community within, and across, the 
groups concerned—a universal type of solidarity would be unworkable.29  
Some authors have found a way to transcend (in part) this apparent 
incompatibility by underscoring the inclusive facet of solidarity, positing that 
‘cosmopolitan forms of solidarity do not extend to the universal moral community’ 
(thus, accepting the need of a pre-defined group different from the whole of mankind) 
‘but still transcend ethnic or national delimitations’30 (organising solidarity along 
ethical lines, instead of around classic communitarian concerns).31 Solidarity, within 
this framework, consists in the ‘ability to see more and more traditional differences 
[…] as unimportant when compared with similarities’, it is ‘the ability to think of 
people wildly different from ourselves as included in the range of “us”’,32 albeit 
accepting the premise of the need for a ‘community’ (i.e. an ‘us’ opposable to a 
‘them’) as an existential, sine qua non precondition for distributive justice to be 
realized.33 
For others, the notion of a globale Gemeinschaft is entirely disposable. 
Brunkhorst, for instance, urges thinkers to stop yearning for an impossible global 
political society, and embrace the alternative concept of a global legal community 
(globale Rechtsgenossenschaft) instead. From his perspective, this suffices to 
guarantee dignity and equality for all, even in the absence of a universal demos or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See, among others, K. Bayertz, ‘Four Uses of Solidarity’, in K. Bayertz (ed.), Solidarity (Springer, 
1999) 3; J. Bohman, ‘Democracy, Solidarity and Global Exclusion’, 32 Philosophy and Social 
Criticism (2006), p. 809; and C. Calhoun, ‘Constitutional Patriotism and the Public Sphere: Interests, 
Identity and Solidarity in the Integration of Europe’, 18 International Journal of Politics, Culture and 
Society (2005), p. 257. 
29 Cf. N. Stevenson, ‘European Cosmopolitan Solidarity: Questions of Citizenship, Difference and 
Post-Materialism’, 9 European Journal of Social Theory (2006), p. 485; J. Schwartz, ‘From Domestic 
to Global Solidarity: The Dialectic of the Particular and the Universal in the Building of Social 
Solidarity’ 38 Journal of Social Philosophy (2007), p. 131. 
30 S. Derpmann, ‘Solidarity and Cosmopolitanism’, 12 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2009), p. 
303, p. 313.  
31 See, generally, M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Basic Books, 1983). 
32 R. Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (CUP, 1989), p. 192. Cf. ‘Organic solidarity’ originating 
from interdependency rather than similarity between group members, which rather constitutes 
‘mechanic solidarity’, based on emotion and empathy, in E. Durkheim, The Division of Labour in 
Society (Macmillan, 1984), at 68 ff. 
33 D. Miller, ‘Community and Citizenship’, in S. Avineri and A. De Shalit (eds.), Communitarianism 
and Individualism (OUP, 1992), p. 94; Mason, Community, Solidarity and Belonging (CUP, 2000), p. 
134. 
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politically organised Bruderschaft.34 The starting point is no longer the specific group 
and the bonds uniting its members, as putative ‘generators’ (and recipients) of 
solidarity, but rather their legal ethos and substantive commitment to (universal) basic 
rights. The focus of analysis is not the empirical ‘origin’ in any particular social 
reality, but the normative ‘result’ and aspiration of solidarity embedded in the legal 
rules and ideals they encapsulate. It is this ‘communion through law’ that a 
(cosmopolitan) ‘solidarity of values’ denotes. In this vein, several authors recognise 
the configuration of human rights as erga omnes obligations like an expression of a 
rudimental bonum commune approach present at the universal level; as proof of a 
certain degree of (global) solidarity inscribed in international law, enshrining a value-
based commitment.35 
This version of solidarity, based on (positivized) universal minimum standards 
of fairness, is present in the EU legal order—alongside other community-based, 
transnational forms of solidarity.36 Plausibly, the founding tenets of ‘respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights [alongside] pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between men and women[…]’ in Article 2 TEU are exemplary of 
Brunkhorst’s globale Rechtsgenossenschaft. These universal values are 
shared/shareable on a global scale as much as they are ‘common to the Member 
States’, and as such they must ‘prevail’ in ‘the process of creating an ever closer 
Union’.37 The (explicit) recognition that this exercise be principally oriented to 
‘deepen the solidarity between their peoples’38 (i.e. those of the Member States) does 
not per se exclude the external (cosmopolitan) dimension of solidarity, as the next 
sections elaborate.39  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 H. Brunkhorst, Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community (MIT Press, 2005). 
See also S. Benhabib, The Rights of Others (CUP, 2004); S. Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism 
(OUP, 2006).   
35 See, e.g., M.T. Kotzur and k. Schmalenbach, ‘Solidarity among Nations’, 52 Archiv des Völkerrechts 
(2014), p. 68; R. Wolfrum, ‘Solidarity’, in D. Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (OUP, 2013), p. 401; H.G. Koroma, ‘Solidarity: Evidence of an Emerging 
International Legal Principle’, in H.P. Hestermeyer et al. (eds.), Coexistence, Cooperation and 
Solidarity — Liber Amicorum Rüdiger Wolfrum (Brill, 2011), p. 103.  
36 A. Sangiovanni, ‘Solidarity in the European Union’, 33 OJLS (2013), p.1; F. De Witte, Justice in the 
EU: The Emergence of Transnational Solidarity (OUP, 2015). 
37 TEU, Article 2 and Preamble. See also TEU, Article 1. 
38 TEU, Preamble.   
39  Something similar happens with the European Convention of Human Rights, 1950 CETS 5 
(hereafter: ECHR). The fact that human rights obligations primarily benefit citizens and residents 
within territorial domain does not impede the extraterritorial protection of aliens abroad, but coming 
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3. Solidarity as Founding Value, General (Meta-)Principle, and Primary 
Obligation  
 
The normative capital and legal standing of Article 2 TEU values has been expressly 
recognised by the Court of Justice (CJEU).40 It is in Kadi where they were hailed to 
the top of the pyramid of legal sources, as part of the ‘constitutional principles’ of EU 
law. They are of such critical importance to the integration project that the EU 
Treaties ‘in no circumstances permit any challenge to the principles that form part of 
the very foundations of the Community legal order’.41 As a result, they are bound to 
succeed in case of conflict,42 and, like other general principles, they must guide the 
validity, construction, and application of secondary law.43 Therefore, ‘if the wording 
of secondary [EU] law is open to more than one interpretation, preference should be 
given to the interpretation which renders the provision consistent with the [EU] 
Treaty rather than to the interpretation which leads to its being incompatible with the 
Treaty’.44 And regarding implementation, the CJEU has added that ‘Member States 
must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent with [EU] law but 
also make sure they do not rely on an interpretation of wording of secondary 
legislation which would be in conflict with […] general principles of [EU] law’.45 
Arguably, EU founding values qua general (‘constitutional’) principles are 
located at even higher a level than ‘ordinary’ EU primary law, as a special breed of 
constitutional provisions. Hence, in the event of a clash with exogenous (e.g. public 
international law) norms ‘any derogation from the principles […] enshrined in Article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
within the remit of State jurisdiction. See, generally, M. Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (OUP, 2011). 
40 Cf. E. Kucuk, ‘Solidarity in EU Law: An Elusive Political Statement or a Legal Principle with 
Substance?’, 23 MJECL (2016), p. 965, p. 975, relying on the Habermasian definition of values as 
‘intersubjectively shared preferences’ devoid of legal effect, disregarding the nature of Art 2 TEU and 
the CJEU’s pronouncements in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi [2008] ECR I-6351 
(hereafter: Kadi I); confirmed: Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Kadi 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:518.  
41 Kadi I, para. 304. 
42 Ibid., para. 285. 
43 On the nature and functions of general principles, see, extensively, U. Bernitz and J. Nergelius (eds.), 
General Principles of European Community Law (Kluwer, 2000); T. Tridimas, The General Principles 
of EU Law (OUP, 2nd edn, 2007); A. Von Bogdandy and J. Bast (eds.), Principles of European 
Constitutional Law (Hart/Beck/Nomos, 2011). 
44 C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux [2007] ECR I-5305, para. 28. 
45 Ibid. 
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[2 TEU] as a foundation of the Union’ is prohibited.46 By contrast, market freedoms 
could exceptionally be derogated from in accordance with today’s Article 351 TFEU. 
Consequently, Article 2 TEU values (within which solidarity is contained), as 
founding meta-principles of European integration, constitute a frame of reference or 
‘constitutional paradigm’,47 which is to govern the lawfulness, interpretation, and 
operationalization of the entire body of EU law. Solidarity, through this lens, should 
work ‘in much the same way that the principles of equal treatment or non-
discrimination’ and, thus, ‘transform existing legal relationships’, ‘shaping and 
directing other core values and legal institutions’.48 Once streamlined, solidarity 
should dictate choice between alternative options and direct preferences towards the 
most ‘solidarity-friendly’ among those available. Legal outcomes should hereafter be 
mediated and penetrated by solidarity (both in internal and external policies). 
Although the Court did not deem it necessary in Kadi to trace the bases of 
founding values, whether in the common constitutional traditions of Member States or 
otherwise, as far as solidarity is concerned, it may be worth noticing that it is 
expressly mentioned in (some of) the national constitutions, taking on multiple 
functions. For instance, in Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution, solidarity is referred 
to as the principle articulating the relationship between the different autonomous 
regions in which the country’s territory is administratively divided, underscoring its 
inter-territorial or ‘horizontal’ dimension.49 Article 2 of the Italian Constitution, in 
turn, recognises the ‘vertical’ facet of solidarity, as applied to the relationship 
between the individual and the State, calling on governmental authorities to ensure 
adherence to ‘inalienable obligations of political, economic and social solidarity’.50 
Finally, the French Constitution relies on ‘systemic’ solidarity as organising rationale 
of the ‘francophonie’—an entity offering the French Republic and freely adhering 
overseas territories and former colonies ‘new institutions [different from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Kadi I, para. 303. 
47 M. Ross, ‘Solidarity—A New Constitutional Paradigm for the EU?’, in M. Ross and Y. Borgmann-
Prebil (eds), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union (OUP, 2010), p. 23. 
48 Ibid., at 36.  
49 Constitución Española, Article 2, BOE-A-1978-31229: ‘La Constitución se fundamenta en la 
indisoluble unidad de la Nación española, patria común e indivisible de todos los españoles, y reconoce 
y garantiza el derecho a la autonomía de las nacionalidades y regiones que la integran y la solidaridad 
entre todas ellas’ (emphasis added), <https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-1978-31229>.   
50 Costituzione Italiana, Article 2: ‘La Repubblica riconosce e garantisce i diritti inviolabili dell'uomo, 
sia come singolo sia nelle formazioni sociali ove si svolge la sua personalità, e richiede l'adempimento 
dei doveri inderogabili di solidarietà politica, economica e sociale’ (emphasis added), 
<http://www.governo.it/costituzione-italiana/principi-fondamentali/2839>.   
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aggregate of its members] founded on the common ideals of liberty, equality and 
fraternity’, 51  thereby highlighting the institutional, regime-related nature of 
solidarity.52 All these facets—it is posited—are encompassed in the common legal 
heritage of the EU.53   
Examples of this tripartite configuration of solidarity can be found across 
common policies.54 Within the cohesion policy context—one of the most integrated 
areas where the Union shares competence with the Member States55—the Regional 
Development Fund ‘is intended to help to redress the main regional imbalances in the 
Union […]’.56 Cohesion funds have a similar mission.57 The overarching objective is 
to ensure the ‘overall harmonious development’ of the Union as a whole.58 Solidarity 
herein translates an inter-state concern for the reduction of (material) disparities, so as 
to alleviate ‘the backwardness of the least favoured areas’.59 But solidarity takes 
centre-stage from a ‘vertical’, State-individual perspective as well, advancing the 
wellbeing of the peoples of Europe, ‘foster[ing] social cohesion and social 
sustainability, and mak[ing] sure that no individual is left behind’.60 Finally, the 
‘systemic’ dimension of solidarity is also at play, which, on one hand, requires 
Member States to ‘conduct their economic policies […] in such a way as […] to attain 
[cohesion] objectives’ and, on the other hand, demands that the concrete ‘formulation 
and implementation of the Union’s policies […] shall contribute to their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Constitution de la République française, Preamble and Article 87: ‘En vertu de ces principes et de 
celui de la libre détermination des peuples, la République offre aux territoires d’outre-mer qui 
manifestent la volonté d’y adhérer des institutions nouvelles fondées sur l’idéal commun de liberté, 
d’égalité et de fraternité et conçues en vue de leur évolution démocratique’ and ‘La République 
participe au développement de la solidarité et de la coopération entre les États et les peuples ayant le 
français en partage’ (emphasis added): <http://www.assemblee-
nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp>.   
52 For a different configuration of the three dimensions, see I. Domurath, ‘The Three Dimensions of 
Solidarity in the EU Legal Order: Limits of the Judicial and Legal Approach’, 35 Journal of European 
Integration (2013), p. 459. 
53 Cf. R. Cotterrell, ‘Images of Europe in Sociolegal Traditions’, in V. Gessner and D. Nelken (eds.), 
European Ways of Law (Hart, 2007) 21. 
54 TFEU, Articles 174 ff (cohesion); TFEU, Article 222 (terrorism); Article 194 (energy); Article 122 
TFEU (economic policy). On the latter, see A. Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional 
Perspective (OUP, 2015); P. Hilpold, ‘Understanding Solidarity within EU Law: An Analysis of the 
“Islands of Solidarity” with Particular Regard to Monetary Union’, 34 OYEL (2015), p. 257. For an 
overview, see Y. Borgmann-Prebil and M. Ross, ‘Promoting European Solidarity: Between Rhetoric 
and Reality’, in M. Ross and Y. Borgmann-Prebil, Promoting Solidarity in the European Union, p. 1.  
55 TFEU, Articles 2(2) and 4(2)(c). 
56 TFEU, Article176. 
57 TFEU, Article 177. 
58 TFEU, Article 174(1). 
59 TFEU, Article 174(2). 
60 European Commission, ‘Opportunities, access and solidarity’, COM(2007) 726, and ‘Renewed 
social agenda’, COM(2008) 412. 
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achievement’.61 Ultimately, solidarity works to agglutinate the different facets of the 
policy and enhance their combined effect, as a sort of ‘framework obligation’ on the 
Union and its Member States to cooperate in good faith for the attainment of the 
cohesion goal, introducing a triple duty of conduct, loyalty, and result.  
This tridimensional nature of solidarity is also present in the common defence 
and security policy—typically considered the least integrated policy domain due to its 
predominantly intergovernmental character. At the horizontal level, Article 42(7) 
TEU creates the specific obligation on all Member States to aid a fellow Member 
State that becomes the victim of ‘armed aggression’. The duty is one of conduct, to be 
pursued ‘by all the means in their power’. The systemic goal is, presumably, to 
demonstrate amity and commitment to ‘the progressive framing of a common Union 
defence policy’62 that serves ‘to protect the Union’s values’.63 If the aggression takes 
the form of a terrorist attack, the ‘solidarity clause’ in Article 222 TFEU explicitly 
requires ‘[t]he Union and its Member States [to] act jointly in a spirit of solidarity’. 
Thus, the Union ‘shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal’, whereas the 
Member States ‘shall assist’ and, to that end, ‘shall coordinate between themselves’ 
the most adequate response. The vertical dimension of solidarity is present too, in that 
the action undertaken must be directed to ‘protect democratic institutions and the 
civilian population’.64  
So, confirming Kadi findings on constitutional value-principles, solidarity 
emerges as all-pervasive. Although its concrete content may be fluid, contextual, and 
with varying degrees of thickness, depending on the circumstances, it does permeate 
the European project in a structural way, whatever the policy area, type of 
competence, and level of integration concerned. It constitutes both an objective and 
privileged means towards the achievement of key (federalising) aims. There is a 
symbiotic relationship between ‘an ever closer Union’ and solidarity—understood as 
‘a shared interest […] in the integrity of [the] common political life form’ embodied 
in the EU.65 ‘More integration’ correspondingly requires ‘more solidarity’.66 As a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 TFEU, Article 175(1). 
62 TEU, Article 42(2). 
63 TEU, Article 42(5). 
64 TFEU, Article 222(1)(a), 2nd indent. 
65 J. Bast, ‘Deepening Supranational Integration: Interstate Solidarity in EU Migration Law’, 22 EPL 
(2016), p. 289, p. 289. 
66 R. Bieber and F. Maiani, ‘Sans solidarité point d’Union européenne: Regards croisés sur les crises de 
l’Union économique et monétaire et du Système européen commun d’asile’, RTDE (2012), p. 295, p. 
298. 
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dynamic and contextual meta-principle of constitutional rank, it underpins, as the next 
section illustrates, the construction of the Internal Market, the maintenance of the 
Euro, as well as the development of the CEAS, requiring joint action and mutual 
support for the continuous fulfilment of Treaty ambitions.  
So defined, solidarity shares links with the principle of sincere cooperation in 
Article 4(3) TEU, which mandates collective loyalty by the Union and the Member 
States in the performance of their respective obligations and compels them, ‘in full 
mutual respect’, to take active steps and/or refrain from noxious conduct that may 
‘jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives’.67 In a way, Article 4(3) TEU 
represents the ‘systemic’ facet of solidarity that reflects the mutuality and reciprocal 
dependence of the Union and the Member States in the realisation of EU integration.68 
But, solidarity (not only as principle but as cross-cutting EU value) is arguably 
broader and more fundamental.69 As part of Article 2 TEU, it provides both the 
starting place and final goal to ‘the whole of the Community system’.70 Unlike 
loyalty, it gives rise to (autonomous) obligations, demanding positive action of a 
special (solidarity-prone) kind that translates it into operational policy.71 It creates 
concrete benefits and responsibilities towards the EU common good,72 and requires 
fidelity to collective values, despite individual losses against self-interest.73 Thus 
configured, solidarity relates to a European public interest, which transcends the sum 
of the individual (inward-looking, self-serving) preoccupations of each Member 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 On loyalty as general principle and manifestation of solidarity, see M. Ross, in M. Ross and Y. 
Borgmann-Prebil (eds.), Promoting Solidarity in the European Union, p. 23.; J. Temple Lang, ‘Article 
10 EC – The Most Important “General Principle” of Community Law’, in U. Bernitz, J. Nergelius, and 
C. Cardner (eds.), General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development (Kluwer, 2008) 77; E. 
Neframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application in the Field of External 
Relations’, 47 CMLRev (2010), p. 323.  
68 B. De Witte, ‘Institutional Principles: A Special Category of General Principles of EC Law’, in 
Bernitz and Nergelius, General Principles of European Community Law, p. 153. 
69 In this vein, see analysis by D. Thym & E. Tsourdi in this special issue on how solidarity interlocks, 
but does not overlap, with the principle of loyalty. Cf. M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law 
(OUP, 2014), p. 298-299, for whom loyalty ‘is an enforceable, primarily vertically directed principle, 
[while] solidarity is rather political’ and has no legal strength.  
70 Joined Cases 6/69 and 11/69 Commission v. France [1969] ECLI:EU:C:1969:68, para. 16.  
71 D. Vanheule, J. Van Selm, and C. Boswell, The Implementation of Article 80 TFEU on the Principle 
of Solidarity and Fair Sharing of Responsibility, Study PE 453.167 (European Parliament, 2011). Cf. J. 
J. Bast 22 EPL (2016), p. 289, p. 293, positing that Article 80 TFEU ‘expands the scope of the EU’s 
competence’.  
72 Case 39/72 Commission v. Italy [1973] ECLI:EU:C:1973:13, para. 20-25.  
73 Cf. E. Kucuk, 16 MJECL (2009), p. 965, p. 968, embracing the view that ‘it is generally possible to 
speak of strict solidarity obligations only when they are driven by self-interest’. For similar positions, 
see A. Sangiovanni, ‘Solidarity in the European Union: Problems and Prospects’, in J. Dickson and P. 
Eleftheriadis (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of EU Law (OUP, 2012); and P. Van Parijs, ‘Genuine 
Solidarity: Coffee Pot or Cappuccino?’, in J. Dreze (ed.), On the Interaction between Subsidiarity and 
Interpersonal Solidarity (Re-Bel Initiative, 2009).  
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State.74 This is why for Member States to embrace their ‘own conception of national 
interest’ 75  constitutes a ‘failure in duty of solidarity […] [that] strikes at the 
fundamental basis of the Community legal order’.76 
 
4. Article 80 TFEU: ‘Solidarity and Fair Sharing of Responsibility’ in EU 
Asylum Law 
 
Article 80 TFEU transposes the general value-principle of solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility within EU asylum policy. 77  Both elements of the composite 
command it entails are interconnected—responsibility sharing being the consequence 
of solidarity; solidarity constituting the motivating factor for responsibility sharing.78 
Solidarity in this guise requires ‘appropriate measures’ to ensure compliance with the 
principle every time (or ‘whenever’) it is necessary. Thus formulated, it not only 
provides a general framework for political deliberations and policy decisions, as a 
programmatic guideline of sorts,79 but constitutes a central structural imperative, 
requiring the Union to act to guarantee suitable (solidarity-proof) outcomes.80 It is a 
functional call for joint performance of a collectively defined objective that cannot be 
achieved by single Member States acting alone. This is why, an understanding of 
solidarity as a sporadic ‘voluntary’ gesture, ‘com[ing] from the heart’, as Commission 
President Juncker propounds in relation to ‘the refugee crisis’, is at odds with the 
wording, the spirit, and the broader logic of Article 80 TFEU.81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 On the identification of the public interest/common good in supranational polities, like the EU, see J. 
Lenoble and M. Maesschalck, ‘Reviewing the Theory of Public Interest: The Quest for a Reflexive and 
Learning-Based Approach to Governance’, in O. De Schutter and J. Lenoble (eds.), Reflexive 
Governance: Redefining the Public Interest in a Pluralistic World (Hart, 2010) 3; J. Lenoble and M. 
Maesschalck, Democracy, Law and Governance (Ashgate, 2010).  
75 Case 128/78 Commission v. UK [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:32, para. 12.  
76 Commission v. Italy Commission v. Italy [1973], para. 25 (emphasis added).  
77 Art 80 TFEU. On this provision consecrating a single principle, see contributions by E. Tsourdi, and 
that of F. Maiani to this volume. Cf. European Commission, ‘A European Agenda on Migration’, 
COM(2015) 240, p. 2; The Bratislava Roadmap, 16 Sept. 2016, under II; and Council Conclusions 20-
21 Oct. 2016, EUCO 31/16, para. 9, decoupling the two. 
78 See also G. Morgese, ‘Solidarietà e ripartizione degli oneri in materia di asilo nell’Unione Europea’, 
in G. Caggiano (ed.), I Percorsi Giuridici Per L’integrazione (Giappichelli, 2014), p. 370, p. 373. 
79 See, e.g., P. De Bruycker, ‘L’espace de liberté, de sécurité et de justice’, in M. Dony and E. Bribosia 
(eds), Commentaire de la Constitution de l’Union européenne (ULB Press, 2004) 279; and D. Thym, 
‘Artikle 80’, in Grabitz et al. (eds.), Das Recht der Europäischen Union (Beck, 2010). 
80 Similarly, see I. Goldner Lang, ‘Is There Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU’, 9 CYELP 
(2013), p. 1, and the contribution of E. Tsourdi to this special issue.  
81  State of the Union Address 2016, SPEECH-16-3043, at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm>. See also European Council, ‘European Pact on Immigration and 
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On a systematic reading of the provision, the immediate intention of Article 80 
TFEU solidarity is to deliver fairness ‘between the Member States’ and to procure a 
‘balance of efforts’ regarding the reception of protection seekers and grants of 
asylum.82 But the final goal must not be lost of sight. The ultimate aspiration towards 
which all institutional and material efforts (both single and collective) must converge 
is the development of ‘a common policy on asylum…with a view to offering 
appropriate status to any [TCN] requiring international protection’.83 The delivery of 
fairness to TCNs, in line with fundamental rights (qua essential/universal 
requirements of justice under the cosmopolitan vision of solidarity), is the 
overarching rationale—as specified in the ‘general provisions’ opening Title V 
TFEU.84 Accordingly, within the CEAS, inter-state solidarity is a-means-to-an-end 
that must, above all, attend to refugee protection needs.  
Article 80 TFEU, combined with Article 78 TFEU, arguably provides a legal 
basis for action to that effect.85 Solidarity modulates the quality of that action, as one 
that must apportion responsibilities in a way that amounts to real ‘sharing’, as 
opposed to mere ‘allocation’, of protection duties. Considerations of equity and 
justness ought to be taken into account in such exercise.86 The final result must be one 
that is doubly fair: between Member States and towards asylum seekers/refugees. 
Structurally, this ‘double fairness’ criterion should permeate the CEAS on a 
permanent, ex ante basis. Contrary to the ad hoc, emergency-driven, exceptional 
solidarity logic underpinning Article 78(3) TFEU (and Juncker’s approach), whereby 
‘in the event of […] an emergency situation […] provisional measures for the benefit 
of the Member State(s) concerned’ may be adopted, the kind of solidarity contained in 
Article 80 TFEU requires a ‘normalisation’ of solidarity that incorporates it as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Asylum’, Council doc. 13440/08, p. 9; and European Commission, ‘Policy Plan on Asylum’, 
COM(2008) 360, para. 5.1. 
82 The ‘balance of efforts’ wording is found in the former TEC, Article 63(2)(b), preceding TFEU, 
Article 78.  
83 TFEU, Article 78(1).  
84 TFEU, Articles 67(1) and (2). See also TFEU, Article 79(1) on ‘fair treatment’ of TCNs as guiding 
principle of EU migration policy. Generally, on the constitutional standing of fundamental rights, see 
TEU Article 2, 6 and the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights (hereafter: EUCFR). 
85 In this line, see S. Peers, ‘Legislative Update: EU Immigration and Asylum Competence and 
Decision-Making in the Treaty of Lisbon’, 10 EJML (2008), p. 219, p. 236.  
86  TFEU, Article 78(2)(e) must, as a result, be read in line with the imperatives of TFEU, Article 80, 
which must, in turn, take account of the final goal of TFEU, Article 78(1), in accordance with TFEU, 
Article 67(1) and TEU, Article 6(1) parameters.  
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compulsory, basilar foundation of the common asylum policy, setting aside national 
self-interest.87  
This is not to say that on top of the ‘normal’ solidarity-based system to be 
organised around Article 80 TFEU (‘shall’) imperatives, there should not be 
‘additional’ (‘may’) solidarity measures grounded in Article 78(3) TFEU to provide 
targeted assistance in exceptional conditions. 88  But reliance on ‘exceptional’ 
(additional) solidarity in particular circumstances does nothing to undo the obligatory 
character of Article 80 TFEU as a ‘general’ (structural) rule addressed both to the EU 
and the Member States in the elaboration of asylum policies and their implementation 
to facilitate the attainment of Treaty goals. Solidarity, as a structural, functional 
command, whereby entire policy domains must be (permanently) arranged in a way 
that guarantees cooperation and sharing of burdens in compliance with fundamental 
rights has implications both for existing measures, e.g. the Dublin Regulation,89 and 
the instruments to come.  
Conditioning solidarity upon Member States (especially those at the EU’s 
external frontiers) assuming full Dublin charges, disregarding the unfairness in 
allocation the Regulation imports into the CEAS, insisting on ‘individual 
responsibility’,90 amounts to the consolidation of pre-Lisbon inequities (in part) 
‘created’ by a system of distribution that exacerbates imbalance, as Maiani highlights 
in this volume. This is why, the admission that Dublin ‘was not devised as a burden 
sharing instrument’ and that ‘its functioning may de facto result in additional 
burdens’,91 in contravention to the core content of Article 80 TFEU, should prompt a 
complete overhaul of the system’s basic assumptions and overall design—instead of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 Both provisions (TFEU Articles 78(3) and 80) cannot mean the same. The principle against 
redundancy prevents such a reductionist construction of separate obligations. See, e.g., A. 
Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (OUP, 2008), at 422 
ff. This argument is also developed in the contribution of E. Tsourdi in this volume.  
88 See, e.g., E. Guild, C. Costello, and V. Moreno-Lax, The Implementation of the 2015 Relocation 
Decisions, Study PE 583.132 (European Parliament, 2017) and references therein. 
89 Regulation 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application 
for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a 
stateless person (recast), [2013] OJ L 180/31, (hereafter: Dublin Regulation). 
90 See, e.g., Council of the European Union, ‘Council Conclusions on a common framework for 
genuine and practical solidarity’, 8 March 2012, para. 8, at: 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/130731.pdf>. See also 
European Commission, ‘Enhanced intra-EU solidarity in the field of asylum’, COM(2011) 835. 
91 Policy Plan on Asylum, COM(2008) 360, para. 5.1.2. See also European Commission, ‘Green Paper 
on the future CEAS’, COM(2007) 301, para. 4.1. 
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the ‘corrective’ approach proposed by the Commission.92 The political elevation of 
Dublin as the ‘cornerstone’ of the CEAS,93 above the exigencies of primary norms, 
contravenes the most basic tenets on the hierarchy of sources of EU law—especially 
in the post-Lisbon context of positivized solidarity. 94 The ‘first country of entry’ rule, 
following which asylum claims are to be allocated to the Member State most 
responsible for the presence of the refugee in the EU (as if geographical fortuity could 
be determined or controlled), shifts, rather than shares, responsibility. It has no basis 
in the Refugee Convention—its blame-based rationale may even contravene the 
principle of non-penalisation for irregular entry enshrined in Article 31-95 and its logic 
disfavours distributive justice. In the optic of Article 80 TFEU, it is both inappropriate 
and unnecessary. It transgresses the level of discretion allowed in the choice of means 
to realize the explicit objectives of solidarity and responsibility sharing. 
A ‘re-balancing’ approach such as that put forward in the Dublin IV Proposal 
would be justified, if the initial allocation were even (yet imperfect) or, at least, not 
manifestly unfair.96 But, in so far as responsibility criteria (by design) overburden 
certain Member States, rendering them unable to cater for the rights of protection 
seekers, as the Commission avows, 97  the system should be adjudged 
unconstitutional.98 Instead, what Article 80 TFEU requires is a regime of collective 
and concerted responsibility that capacitates achievement of the CEAS’ aims.99 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast), COM(2016) 270 (hereafter: 
Dublin IV Proposal).  
93 Ibid., p. 4.  
94 Art 80 TFEU was apparently codified, precisely, as a reaction to inequalities consolidating in the 
asylum policy field. See C. Kaunert and S. Leonard, ‘The EU Asylum Policy: Towards a Common 
Area of Protection and Solidarity?’, in S. Wolff, F. Goudappel, and J.W. de Zwaan (eds), Freedom 
Security and Justice after Lisbon and Stockholm (TMC Asser Press, 2011), p. 79.  
95 Cf. Explanatory Memorandum, Dublin II Proposal, COM(2001) 447, para. 3.1: ‘[…] each Member 
State is answerable to all the others for its actions concerning the entry and residence of [TCNs] and 
must bear the consequences thereof in a spirit of solidarity and fair cooperation’.  
96 For a critique, see the contribution of F. Maiani in this volume; and E. Guild, C. Costello, and V. 
Moreno-Lax, The Implementation of the 2015 Relocation Decisions, Study PE 583.132 (European 
Parliament, 2017).  
97 European Commission, ‘Towards a Reform of the CEAS’, COM(2016) 197, p. 4.  
98 On the unconstitutionality of Dublin, see E. Kucuk, ‘The Principle of Solidarity and Fairness in 
Sharing Responsibility: More than Window Dressing?’ (2016) 22 ELJ, p. 448. 
99 A mechanism of à la carte contribution or ‘flexible/effective solidarity’, such as that proposed by the 
Visegrad countries, would be inappropriate. See Solidarity and responsibility in the CEAS – progress 
report by the Slovak Presidency, Council doc. 15253/16, 5 Dec. 2016. 
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Reactive, compensatory solidarity is therefore not enough.100 Article 80 TFEU calls 
for a proactive, structural solidarity-based arrangement that optimizes the CEAS’ 
effectiveness.101 Solidarity therein should be apprehended as a tripartite institutional, 
procedural, and material duty of shared responsibility that is ab initio fair.  
Such a comprehensive understanding has not yet been pronounced by the 
CJEU. It had an opportunity, in Halaf, to determine whether the so-called 
‘sovereignty clause’ of the Dublin Regulation is to be interpreted in line with the 
principle of solidarity, but it chose to resolve the case on other bases.102 In fact, the 
Court has tackled the solidarity question in piecemeal fashion. In N.S., it recognised 
the limits of discretion in the establishment of a regime of responsibility allocation 
like Dublin (‘resulting in a disproportionate burden [for Greece] and the inability to 
cope with the situation in practice’)103 through a systemic interpretation of Article 78 
TFEU, prohibiting intra-EU transfers of asylum seekers to a Member State 
‘experiencing major operational problems’, exposing transferees to treatment 
‘incompatible with their fundamental rights’.104 However, it only mentioned Article 
80 TFEU in passing.105 In GISTI, the Court then addressed the matter of financial 
sharing of reception costs.106 Reasoning on human dignity grounds, it favoured a 
construction of reception obligations based on physical presence of the claimant in the 
Member State concerned, regardless of whether it is the ‘responsible country’ 
following Dublin rules, concluding that ‘the asylum seeker may not […] be 
deprived—even for a temporary period […]—of the protection of the minimum 
standards laid down by [the CEAS]’.107  
This reading of solidarity, as underpinned by an effective commitment to the 
protection of fundamental rights, is also present, for instance, in the case law on the 
intersection between the single market and EU citizenship. Regarding the stay of EU 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 For an assessment of ‘compensatory’ measures external to the Dublin Regulation, such as the 
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Tsourdi in this volume and references therein. 
101 On solidarity working as an ‘optimization command’, see E. Karageorgiou, ‘The Law and Practice 




102 C‑528/11 Halaf [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:342, para. 25 ff. 
103 Joined Cases C‑411/10 and C‑493/10 N.S. and M.E. [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, para. 87. 
104 Ibid., para. 81 and 94 ff. 
105 Ibid., para. 93. 
106 C‑179/11 Cimade & GISTI [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:594, paras 59-60. 
107 Ibid., para. 56. 
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nationals in a host Member State, specially those non-economically active, the Court 
has developed the concept of ‘a certain degree of financial solidarity’ that must be 
shown towards certain categories of EU residents able to show a meaningful link to it 
(through prior lawful residence of sufficient length).108 Although the conditions for 
such link to be established have become stricter in the post-financial crisis 
environment,109 the ‘solidarity obligation’ per se still remains.110 This is essential to 
ensuring that ‘Union citizenship [becomes] the fundamental status of nationals of the 
Member States’, 111  presumably so as to ‘deepen the solidarity between [EU] 
peoples’.112 The justification, borrowing from the Schuman Declaration, is possibly to 
‘build concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity’,113 as a prelude 
to the emergence of a (transnational) European community that ‘feels’ like one. 
Similarly to the financial costs related to the reception of asylum seekers, solidarity 
hereby involves the sharing of resources with the less endowed (who may not be able 
to immediately reciprocate) in the quest for ‘an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe’114 (or the constitution of a CEAS in line with fundamental rights, as in the 
GISTI case). This is how the institutional and material elements of solidarity 
intertwine, through a duty of loyal contribution to a shared, fair result.  
Alongside the vertical facet, the systemic dimension of fairness inscribed in 
the principle of solidarity has also been considered by the CJEU. Systemic fairness—
it is submitted—necessitates both of individual and collective allegiance to the CEAS 
(and the Union) as a whole, so the common policy operates effectively and achieves 
the desired outcome. This is, at least, the understanding espoused in other areas of EU 
law. For example, solidarity has been relied upon (if tacitly) to guarantee the good 
functioning of the single market by regulating the overproduction of steel, even at the 
expense of individual producers, to safeguard the sector as such. 115  The same 
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(Hart, 2005) 161. 
109  D. Thym, ‘The Elusive Limits of Solidarity: Residence Rights of and Social Benefits for 
Economically Inactive Union Citizens’, 52 CMLRev (2015), p. 17. 
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114 TEU, Preamble. 
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philosophy has been employed to justify sugar, milk or wine quotas within the 
Common Agricultural Policy, ‘to provide a degree of control over production whilst 
re-orientating it towards the needs of the market’.116 Arguments regarding specific (or 
even discriminatory) impact on one or the other producer have normally been rejected 
in the name of the higher (common) interests of the system as a whole; that, even with 
regard to producers or entire countries playing no part in the surplus,117 or even 
requiring extra supply to cover a (domestic) production deficit.118 Solidaristic efforts 
by all players (for the benefit of the system itself) have been deemed key in these 
cases (rejecting any blame-based reasoning à la Dublin). 
Finally, the horizontal aspect of solidarity has (implicitly) been mobilized too. 
In relation to the economic crisis, and the no-bailout clause in Article 125 TFEU, the 
Pringle judgment illustrates the point. Therein, the Court concluded to the non-
violation of the prohibition via a (solidarity-enhancing) narrow construction, so that 
EU targeted financial/technical assistance provided for the promotion of sound 
budgetary polices at domestic level was interpreted to be allowed—with only 
complete or straightforward bailouts forbidden. Without mentioning solidarity, the 
principle was nonetheless at work to protect the weakest performers within the 
European stability scheme to thereby preserve the Eurozone as a whole—the 
horizontal facet of solidarity being put at the service of the systemic dimension 
thereof to guarantee the attainment of the higher EU public interest goals.119 Such 
contextual, multi-polar/multi-functional configuration of (horizontal, vertical, and 
systemic) solidarity, entailing institutional, material, and procedural facets, is 
conceivably the same that is inscribed in Article 80 TFEU. 
 
5. The External Dimension: Solidarity as Organising Principle of EU External 
Relations 
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It has been posited that solidarity within the EU and solidarity with the rest of the 
globe cannot possibly mean the same; that intra-EU solidarity ‘distinguishes the EU 
and its members from other parts of the world and international organisations’.120 
From the federalising perspective of the ‘ever closer Union’ envisaged by the 
Treaties,121 taking solidarity as an end in itself, representing a special commitment to 
the constitution of a community of Member States and EU citizens, this may well be 
the case. Yet, as discussed above, solidarity has multiple dimensions and its value as 
an organising principle of EU external relations has been explicitly recognised in 
Lisbon provisions.  
As a result, the largely absent ‘solidarity obligation’ at international (refugee) 
law indicated at the outset is palliated by the EU-grown requirement of solidarity, 
which applies not only internally (by virtue of Article 80 TFEU), but also externally 
(via Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU). What this section advances is that the (independently 
emerged) EU law obligation of solidarity should govern not only the internal facet of 
the CEAS, but its external dimension as well. And that, as it ensues from Article 78 
TFEU, must be understood to entail a duty of engagement through partnership with 
third countries for the management of forced displacement that complies with the 
rights of refugees under the 1951 Convention and other relevant treaties. 
While it is true that the wording of Article 80 TFEU limits solidarity to 
dealings ‘between the Member States’, it is not less certain that contribution to 
(global) solidarity and protection of human rights features as part of the Union’s tasks 
‘[i]n its relations with the wider world’.122 According to Article 21 TEU, ‘[t]he 
Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have 
inspired its own creation [including]…solidarity’. And as a reminder of this specific 
command, the TFEU requires that, not just ‘cooperation’, but true ‘partnerships’ with 
third countries be established ‘for the purposes of managing the inflows of people’ in 
need of international protection, 123  presumably with a view to ‘promot[ing] 
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the 
United Nations’.124  
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Within that framework, the 1951 Convention constitutes an expression of ‘the 
indivisible, universal values’ on which the EU is founded,125 of which (cosmopolitan) 
solidarity vis-à-vis protection seekers and those hosting the highest numbers of exiles 
forms part. The Convention itself recognises the ‘international scope’ of refugees’ 
plight, and enjoins States to find ‘a satisfactory solution’ through the medium of 
‘international cooperation’, requiring them to do ‘everything within their power’ for 
their effective protection, ‘to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension 
between States’ and, at the same time, ‘assure refugees the widest possible exercise of 
[their] fundamental rights and freedoms’.126 Upholding (refugee) rights can thus be 
framed as a manifestation of solidarity grounded in Brunkhorst’s globale 
Rechtsgenossenschaft, part of the global bonum commune represented by the 
protection of human dignity beyond formalised (national/supra-national) bonds.127 As 
the EU Charter confirms, the ‘[e]njoyment of these rights entails responsibilities […] 
with regard to […] the human community’ as a whole.128 So, the call on the Union 
and its Member States should be taken as one of ‘meaningful’ partnership with third 
countries for the realization of the (universal) rights of refugees. 
This essential tenet should guide internal and external action alike. Arguably, 
a common intra/extra-EU (value-based) solidarity underpins them both, which, 
following the principle of uniformity of EU law, should ‘normally be given an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the Union [legal order]’.129 There 
is only one overarching principle of solidarity directing asylum policy (positivized in 
Article 80 TFEU), which (in light of Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU) governs both the 
internal and external dimensions of the CEAS. The principle of coherence, 130 
according to which the EU ‘shall ensure consistency between the different areas of its 
external action and between these and its other policies’, to guarantee the 
‘effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions’, supports this conclusion.131  
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From a substantive perspective, solidarity as a-means-to-an-end within the 
CEAS remains subject to the delivery of ‘fairness’ to TCNs already noted, which 
includes, at minimum, respect for their fundamental rights.132 The fundamental rights 
of asylum seekers and refugees that the EU legal order recognises constitute the 
common framework of primary law norms shared across the internal-external 
continuum of the CEAS that the vertical facet of solidarity encapsulates.133 The fact 
that those in need of protection are non-citizens, coming from abroad, does nothing to 
diminish the legal strength of commitments in their regard. Post-Lisbon, the Charter 
‘shall have the same legal value as the Treaties’.134 In fact, it ‘reaffirms…the rights as 
they result, in particular, from the […] international obligations common to the 
Member States’, 135  including those stemming from the 1951 Convention. 136 
Territoriality/extraterritoriality does not determine per se their applicability. 
Whenever (internal/external) action falls within the remit of EU law, the ‘applicability 
of the […] Charter’ is activated, since there cannot be ‘situations […] which are 
covered […] by European Union law without […] fundamental rights being 
applicable’.137  
The 1951 instrument also affects the systemic side of solidarity. In addition to 
intra-EU loyalty, towards the CEAS (ensuing from the combined reading of Articles 
80 TFEU and 4(3) TEU), extra-EU fidelity to the system of international protection of 
the Refugee Convention is required too, as per Article 78 TFEU. The Treaty makes 
this clear by expressly subjecting the achievement of the CEAS to ‘the [1951] Geneva 
Convention…and other relevant treaties’.138  
 Fairness, therefore, in the apportionment of resources and responsibilities 
within the CEAS, should be achieved not only internally, but also from the viewpoint 
of the universal regime of refugee protection. Whatever action is adopted at EU level, 
it should facilitate, rather than impede, the achievement of the global system’s 
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intended purpose of ‘a satisfactory solution of a problem [i.e. that of forced migration 
on a planetary scale] of which the UN has recognized the international scope’.139 
From this perspective, intra-EU systemic solidarity (towards the CEAS) should be 
deemed at the service of extra-EU systemic solidarity (towards the Refugee 
Convention) for the regional and universal regimes to reach their common goal.140  
Consequently, as part of the exercise of EU public interest identification in 
this context, when devising a responsibility-sharing mechanism in partnership with, or 
having an impact on, third countries, EU (internal/external) solidarity must play a 
role. Confronted with a range of choices, due to the (autonomous) EU law 
requirements flowing from the principle, the legislator should select the one most 
disposed to foster the chain of (intra-EU/extra-EU) ‘systemic fairness’, in order to 
‘ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties’, 141  including 
‘accordance with the [1951] Geneva Convention’.142 
 
6. The EU-Turkey Deal: Example of External Non-solidarity 
 
The horizontal dimension of EU external solidarity may be the least straightforward, 
if communitarian/federalising conceptions of the principle provide the starting place 
of analysis. However, when the overarching interests of the system of international 
protection are taken as reference point instead, it becomes clear that ‘the CEAS must 
[…] provide for genuine solidarity mechanisms, both within the EU and with third 
countries’ and that ‘a higher degree of solidarity and responsibility among the 
Member States, as well as between the EU and third countries’ is essential to 
‘promote refugee protection’ and make the 1951 Convention regime work.143  
 Such ‘external solidarity’, as the European Commission has literally called it, 
may comprise financial support ‘to enhance protection capacity in third countries’,144 
e.g. via Regional Protection Programmes and similar fund transfer initiatives. But, to 
be credible, it should also entail ‘that the Union is ready to take a fair share of 
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responsibility’ for hosting refugees, e.g. via resettlement programmes and 
humanitarian admission schemes,145 as ‘a visible and concrete expression of European 
solidarity towards the international community’.146   
How should ‘fairness’ be appraised in this context remains debatable. But 
many would argue that the EU-Turkey deal, based on the unreserved espousal of the 
STC principle,147 is utterly unfair. Just like the ‘first country of entry’ rule within 
Dublin, it shifts, rather than shares, responsibility on the basis of geographical 
proximity to the country of origin of refugee flows, without considering relevant 
protection or capacity-related criteria. It embraces a type of (misconstrued) 
‘externalisation-based solidarity’ that prevents, rather than facilitates, access to 
asylum.148  
Indeed, the ‘deal’ requires Turkey to accept the ‘rapid return of all migrants 
not in need of international protection crossing from Turkey to Greece and to take 
back all irregular migrants intercepted in Turkish waters’.149 In exchange, for every 
Syrian readmitted to Turkey, another Syrian is to be resettled to the EU, prioritizing 
those who have not previously entered irregularly. In addition, visa facilitation and 
Turkish accession to the EU should be accelerated, and a transfer of EUR 6 billion 
from the EU budget should sustain a Refugee Facility there.150 
 So far, Turkey has accepted the return of 1,487 and blocked the exit of most 
migrants since March 2016—with crossings decreasing from a daily rate of nearly 
3,500 to just 43—although only 3,565 Syrian refugees have been resettled to 
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Europe.151 The presumption is that Turkey is a STC for returns from Greece, despite it 
maintaining a geographical limitation to the 1951 Convention, and regardless of its 
widely documented mistreatment of refugees.152  
Whether the ‘deal’ constitutes a ‘fair’ distribution of asylum responsibilities 
between the EU and Turkey, especially considering that Turkey already hosts 3 
million Syrian refugees,153 depends on how fairness is assessed. On a material 
understanding of fairness, those sharing duties should do so according to an equitable 
scheme, considering the total onus to apportion.154 But, on a procedural reading, 
fairness would depend on the process through which a ‘deal’ is negotiated. Provided 
that the decision-making plan allows all parties to have an equal say in the debate, and 
an equal chance to influence the end result, the final outcome should be considered 
‘fair’.155 Since both Turkey and the EU Member States had similar veto capacities, 
and comparable bargaining powers relative to their positions as transit and destination 
countries, one could plausibly conclude to the ‘fairness’ of the EU-Turkey scheme.  
Yet, such conceptualisation of (procedural) ‘fairness’ omits the wider 
implications of the principle of (external) solidarity identified earlier. It pursues a 
‘pure’ inter-state perspective, discounting the vertical and systemic facets of 
solidarity. It endorses a misconception of the principle that (solely) promotes 
reciprocal self-interest, reifying asylum seekers as ‘burdens’,156 dispossessing them (if 
inadvertently) of their entitlements under international and EU law. Contrariwise, a 
solidarity-based apportionment of asylum duties should be based on a comprehensive 
understanding of fairness (on horizontal, vertical, and systemic grounds), promoting, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 European Commission, ‘Fifth progress report on the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement’, 
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152 PACE Resolution 2109 (2016) on ‘The situation of refugees and migrants under the EU–Turkey 
Agreement of 18 March 2016’, <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-
EN.asp?fileid=22738&lang=en>; Amnesty International, ‘Turkey: Illegal Mass Returns of Syrian 
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153 Syrian Regional Refugee Response, Inter-Agency Information Sharing Portal, 16 February 2017 
<https://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224>. 
154 On this understanding, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, rev. edn., 2003), 
at 53. 
155 On this reading, see J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (MIT Press, 1996), p. 166-167. 
156  For a contestation of this approach, see V. Türk and M. Garlick, ‘From Burdens and 
Responsibilities to Opportunities: The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and a Global 
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rather than undermining, the rights of refugees and the goal of their realization 
underlying the international (and EU) protection regime.157 
Therefore, in so far as the EU-Turkey deal, instead of creating additional (or, 
at least, distributing existing) protection space, reduces chances for refugees to find 
asylum, leading, in the worse cases, to persecution, mistreatment, and chain 
refoulement,158 it cannot be characterised as an expression of (external) solidarity.  
 
7. Conclusion: An All-Pervading Duty of (Internal/External) Good Faith 
Cooperation 
 
Solidarity is not univocal and has not been defined in EU law. However, the 
foregoing has demonstrated that it is all-pervasive and permeates the European project 
in a structural way, as a founding value, constitutional tenet, and (autonomous) 
primary law command of good faith engagement with others (internally and 
externally) in the achievement of EU integration goals. 
The implications of the principle are equally comprehensive. From the 
horizontal perspective, within the asylum policy domain, it arguably entails 
cooperation in consideration of the needs and capacities of EU and third countries, 
constituting a ‘partnership’ worthy of the name, ‘for the purpose of managing inflows 
of people applying for asylum’.159  The vertical dimension intertwines with the 
systemic facet of solidarity, in turn requiring relations with the wider world in a 
manner that produces ‘fair’ outcomes for refugees,160 fulfilling the primary law 
obligation to develop a CEAS ‘with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
[TCN] requiring international protection’, ‘with respect for [their] fundamental 
rights’.161 Finally, the prevalence of the systemic dimension of solidarity in this 
framework is due to the structural configuration of solidarity in Article 80 TFEU as a 
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means-to-an-end in the construction of a CEAS ‘with due respect for the rules’ of the 
(‘mother’) global protection system deriving from international refugee law.162 
The main objective of the article was, thus, to unpack the difference between 
mere ‘international cooperation’ and ‘solidarity’, both explicitly mentioned in the EU 
Treaties as guiding principles of the external dimension of the CEAS,163 making the 
case for an understanding of solidarity as a (legally-binding) EU obligation of ‘shared 
responsibility’, applicable not only between EU Member States inter se, but also 
when action has an (external) impact on the universal regime of international 
protection. After all, the development of a CEAS ‘must be in accordance with the 
[1951] Geneva Convention […] and other relevant treaties’.164 The end goal was to 
delineate the key implications of solidarity qua ‘shared responsibility’ in the three 
dimensions proposed, to establish the concrete contours of the legal duty stipulated in 
Article 80 TFEU.  
This exercise should have direct consequences in the area of asylum policy, 
feeding into current debates on the ‘third phase’ of the instruments concerned.165 It 
should point to the need for an overhaul of the Dublin rationale and the related self-
serving approach currently guiding CEAS external action—resting on STC rules, 
aleatory geographical proximity to refugee flows, and non-access to asylum in the 
EU. But, more widely, the above will hopefully also contribute to the normative 
conceptualization of solidarity and its operationalization as a (meta-)principle of EU 
law with general reach and (coherent) application across policy fields. 
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